Miscellanous articles

 

Main Indexes

Home
Flight 93
Flight 77
Fl 93 & F-16
Miscellanous

Tracking

Aircraft tracking Company

Flight tracking Article

NORAD

Airbases
Aircraft Specs
Civilian Jet

NORAD Scramble sequence

NORAD
timeline

Theories

Conspiracies
Why attack the Pentagon
Hijacker questions
Fl 93 had to be shot down
Questions

Links

Sources
NORAD
Links

Maps

 

Forty-five minutes. That's how long American Airlines Flight 77 meandered through the air headed for the White House, its flight plan abandoned, its radar beacon silent.

 

Published Friday, September 14, 2001

 

Tracking of jet reviewed

 

Who watched as flight plan was aborted?

BY JOSEPH TANFANI AND ALFONSO CHARDY
jtanfani@herald.com

Forty-five minutes. That's how long American Airlines Flight 77 meandered through the air headed for the White House, its flight plan abandoned, its radar beacon silent.

Originally bound for Los Angeles from Washington, it got as far as the Ohio border before terrorists disabled the aircraft's transponder, a piece of equipment that sends a signal back to control centers.

It was about 9 a.m.

At that moment, the north tower of the World Trade Center was already in flames.

Minutes later, a second airliner would crash into the south tower, providing unmistakable evidence that the United States was under terrorist attack.

Meanwhile Flight 77 was turning around, streaking back east over Virginia toward the White House and finally slamming into the Pentagon at 9:45 a.m.

Who was watching in those 45 minutes?

``That's a question that more and more people are going to ask,'' said one controller in Miami. ``What the hell went on here? Was anyone doing anything about it? Just as a national defense thing, how are they able to fly around and no one go after them?''

Even with the transponder silent, the plane should have been visible on radar, both to controllers who handle cross-continent air traffic and to a Federal Aviation Administration command center outside of Washington, according to air traffic controllers.

The FAA, which handles air traffic control, would not discuss the track of Flight 77 or what happened in air-control centers while it was in flight. Neither would American Airlines.

CONTROLLERS' VIEW

On Thursday, FBI agents were trying to answer those questions, interviewing controllers at the regional Air Route Traffic Control Center in Leesburg, Va.

Flight 77 took off at 8:10 a.m. from Dulles International Airport, and proceeded normally until it got to about the Ohio border, according to Flight Explorer, a company that tracks air traffic for private clients. The transponder went off about 9 a.m., the company said.

At that moment, the flight would have been under the control of the Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center, one of 20 regional centers that track flights between airports.

The trouble should have been instantly noticeable, traffic controllers say.

Flight 77, like other planes, at first showed up on radar screens as a short solid line, with a readout that identifies the plane and gives its altitude and speed. When the transponder shuts down, the short line vanishes. The speed number goes away, too.

``It's just something that catches your eye,'' one controller says.

And it's not that unusual. Transponders fail from time to time; commercial aircraft are required to carry a spare. Although it isn't clear what happened in the case of Flight 77, a controller's first move typically would be to contact the pilot, and tell them the transponder wasn't working.

SWITCHING TO RADAR

But even if the plane remained silent, controllers could still find it -- by switching their screen display to the old-fashioned radar that bounces a signal off the plane's metal skin.

Many controllers who track high-flying planes have little experience using that harder-to-read system, one former controller said.

``You'll have controllers with 10 years experience who never track an airplane without a transponder. It just doesn't happen,'' said Ed Freeman, a Maryland consultant who spent 24 years as an air traffic controller.

At about 9:25 a.m., television commentator Barbara Olson called her husband -- Solicitor General Theodore Olson -- and reported that the plane had been hijacked.

Five minutes later, she called back to say the pilot was with the passengers in the back of the plane.

About that time, controllers across the country were frantically trying to get all planes out of the air, ordering all pilots to land at the nearest airport.

Flight 77 was heading directly toward the restricted airspace over the White House when it banked sharply to the right and approached the Pentagon.

Military jets are routinely scrambled in the case of hijackings and ``runners,'' planes that do not answer or do not heed air traffic controllers. But FAA officials would not say when controllers detected the errant Flight 77 or whether any fighter jets were able to get into the air to confront it.

Fighter jets are based nearby, in Virginia, and could have reached the White House within minutes, aviation sources say.

In at least one other case, American Flight 11, controllers knew it was a hijacking while it was in the air.

The pilot, who apparently flew the plane much of the way from Boston to New York, pushed a button on the aircraft yoke that allowed controllers to hear what was going on: the hijacker giving orders in a threatening voice, and the pilot trying to be calm, according to an account in the Christian Science Monitor.

Two F-15 jets were scrambled from Otis Air Force Base in New York, the newspaper reported, but the controllers report the plane vanished from the radar just before or after they got in the air. It was the first plane that hit the World Trade Center tower.

Pilots and controllers have instructions on how to handle a typical hijacking.

If the transponder is still working, pilots punch in a four-digit code that tells controllers the plane is being hijacked. Once that signal is received, a controller is supposed to call the aircraft and ask, subtly, if the pilot meant to send the transmission.

The FAA has a detailed hijacking manual: Supervisors are notified. The FAA command center near Washington and the FBI are put on alert. Military jets are scrambled to follow the plane. Air-traffic controllers try to figure out where the hijacker wants to go and, if necessary, clear an air space of other traffic.

The FBI has well-rehearsed plans to send negotiators and hostage rescue teams to airport.

But there's nothing in the security plan that talks about terrorist-flown planes turned into missiles, say experts and former FAA and FBI officials. The plan assumes hijackers want to use the plane to extort something -- not to use it as a suicide bomb.

``I know we thought and talked about it,'' said Robert M. Blitzer, a consultant and former counterterrorism chief at the FBI.

``I just don't know that anyone imagined in reality that something like this would ever happen.''


Flight 93

 

At some point, before the plane reached Cleveland, the hijackers took over the plane, armed with knives and the threat of a bomb.

Around 9:30 a.m., air-traffic controllers in Cleveland heard someone in the cockpit say, "Hey, get out of here!" according to a source close to the investigation.

Then, in what was described as a thick Arabic accent, a voice was heard that appeared to be addressing passengers, even though it was radioed to air-traffic control.

"This is your captain," the man said. "There is a bomb on board. Remain in your seats. We are returning to the airport."

How the hijackers overpowered the pilots remains unclear. One passenger would report in a telephone call that two people lay on the floor in the first-class cabin, either injured or dead. They appeared to be the pilot and co-pilot, he said, relating information from a flight attendant. Another told a friend that two people had their throats slit but didn't identify them. A third saw only one injured.

At least five passengers and flight attendants described the hijackers in their calls in similar terms: three men, wearing red bandannas, one with some sort of box strapped around his waist that he claimed was a bomb. One passenger reported that two of the hijackers were in the cockpit and a third guarded passengers in first-class from behind a curtain.

4th hijacker not seen

None of the callers mentioned a fourth hijacker, although the FBI has identified four men in connection with the hijacking.

Those men are Saeed Alghamdi, Ahmed Ibrahim A. Al Haznawi, Ahmed Alnami and Ziad Samir Jarrah.

It may be that the people who made calls were unable to see the fourth hijacker. Some news reports have suggested one may have already gained access to the cockpit, as a uniformed guest pilot sitting in the spare jump-seat. Or, some terrorism experts suggest, he may have played a role as a "back-up," perhaps remaining unidentified among the other passengers or hiding in the bathroom until he was needed.

A Justice Department spokeswoman said Friday that their "best information" shows that four were involved.

By 9:36 a.m., United Flight 93 had suddenly changed course, according to flight path information provided by Flight Explorer, a firm that supplies real-time radar tracking data, making a U-turn and heading back toward Washington.

Frantic calls begin

In the cabin, passengers frantically began making calls, 23 of them from the seat-back phones alone from 9:31 to 9:53 a.m. Others passed cell phones to people who had been strangers just minutes before.

Why so many people were able to make calls while apparently under guard by hijackers could be that, as one passenger reported, there was no hijacker among the passengers in coach.

Some of the telephone calls were short--no more than a few rushed words of fear or love.

Lauren Grandcolas, flying home to San Rafael, Calif., from her grandmother's funeral, left a message for her husband saying her flight had been hijacked but she was "comfortable, for now."

Linda Gronlund and Joe Deluca, on their way to San Francisco for a vacation together, took turns. She called her sister to say she would miss her. He called his father.

"The plane's been hijacked," he said. "I love you."

Andrew Garcia, an Air National Guard air traffic controller and plane buff, only managed to get out his wife's name, "Dorothy," before his phone went dead.

Other passengers, though, managed to conduct fairly lengthy, even repeated conversations during the plane's final minutes, constructing a jumbled puzzle of what was happening inside the Boeing 757.

Deena Burnett was feeding her three daughters breakfast and watching the news in horror when the telephone rang in her home in San Ramon, Calif.

"Are you OK?" she asked her husband, Tom, 38.

"No," he said. "I'm on the airplane and it's been hijacked."

He told his wife that the hijackers had already stabbed someone. He told her to call the authorities, and he hung up.

When he called back, she was on the line to the FBI. She told him about the World Trade Center, the first he knew of the attack. He paused. "Were they commercial airplanes?" he asked.

Deena Burnett didn't think so. Cargo or private planes, she said.

"Do you know anything else about the planes?" No, she said.

"Do you know who was involved?" Again, she said no.

He told her that the man who was stabbed had died.

The hijackers are talking about running the plane into the ground, he said. Then he said he had to go.

His third call came about 9:41 a.m., shortly after a plane had hit the Pentagon. "OK," he said. "We're going to do something."

In his fourth and final call, just before 10 a.m., Burnett said he was sure the hijackers didn't have a bomb, that he thought they only had knives.

"There's a group of us who are going to do something," he repeated.

Deena Burnett thought about her years of training as a flight attendant, where she was taught to appease hijackers, to meet their demands, to stay in the background. She told her husband to sit down. "Don't draw attention to yourself," she said.

She told him she loved him. She felt he thought he was coming home that night. This was simply a problem that he was going to solve, as he had solved many others.

Takeover plots hatching

As Burnett talked with his wife, three other men who may have joined him in whatever plans were being hatched made calls of their own.

Across the aisle in Seat 4D, Mark Bingham, 31, called his mother. He was so rattled that when Alice Hoglan got on the line, her son told her, "This is Mark Bingham."

His message was brief: The plane had been hijacked by three men and he loved her.

In the rear of the plane, Jeremy Glick, also 31, a sales manager for a Web site firm and former judo champion, called his wife from a seatback phone. He described three Middle Eastern men brandishing knives and a red box.

His wife told him about the attacks at the World Trade Center. He tried to grasp the hijackers' plans--to blow up the plane or fly it into a target?

The passengers had taken a vote among themselves, he said. They had decided to try to take back the plane.

"I told him to go ahead and do it," Lyzbeth Glick said on "Good Morning America. "I trusted his instincts, and I said, `Do what you have to do.' I knew that I thought he could do it."

Details relayed to operator

Beamer, 32, an account manager for Oracle Corp., called a stranger. He picked up a seat-back phone and hit "0," and at 9:45 a.m., he was connected first to a dispatcher for GTE Airfone, and then to Lisa Jefferson, the operator's supervisor.

For 13 minutes, Beamer told Jefferson everything he could, passing along information he gleaned himself as well as from a flight attendant. The passengers remained in their seats, she said he told her, and the flight attendants were forced to sit in the back of the plane.

He told her how much he loved his pregnant wife and two sons, and he asked her to call them. He asked her to say the Lord's Prayer and 23rd Psalm with him.

Moments later, Beamer told Jefferson about the plan, that the passengers were going to run up the long, narrow aisle to the first-class cabin and attack the hijacker there.

"I'm going to have to go out on faith," Beamer said.

He turned to someone else, and he said, "Are you ready?" Then, in the last words Jefferson would hear from him, "OK. Let's roll."

Sandra Bradshaw, the flight attendant, also identified three hijackers when she called her husband in Greensboro, N.C. She had been moved to the back of the plane, she said, but she and other passengers had a plan. They were going to rush their captors; she was boiling water to throw on them.

Another passenger, Elizabeth Wainio, also apparently talked of a plan to rush the hijackers. In a call she made to her stepmother in Baltimore, using the cell phone lent to her by Lauren Grandcolas, she said, "I've got to go now, Mom, they're breaking into the cockpit," according to the mother of another passenger, who said she spoke with family members about the call. Wainio's parents declined comment.

The accounts of these calls--if accurate--would indicate that at least four people were somehow plotting to attack the hijackers. If Beamer's report is accurate, they were seated in different sections of the plane, with Bingham and Burnett up front, while the others were in the back.

It may be there were separate plans to take the plane or that somehow, amid all the telephone calls, chaos and fear, the passengers were able to communicate with each other.

If they did, they may have known they had another pilot among them, Donald Greene, chief executive officer of Safe Flight Instrument Corp. in New York. Greene, according to his family, knew anything and everything about airplanes.

At about 9:54 a.m., the plane started flying erratically. In Oak Brook, Ill., Jefferson heard screams in the background.

Flight plan changes

Two minutes later, the plane's flight plan changed. The destination airport was changed from San Francisco International to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. Estimated time of arrival: 10:28 a.m.

At nearly the same moment, from the plane's bathroom, someone called 911, repeating that Flight 93 had been hijacked, that this was not a hoax.

Then, Marion Britton called a longtime friend, Fred Fiumano, at his New York City auto shop.

Britton, crying, told him the plane was turning around. It was going to go down.

"Don't worry about it," Fiumano said, trying desperately to reassure her. "They're only taking you for a ride."

He heard yelling and screaming in the background, and then the phone went dead. He tried to call the cellular phone number back, but no one answered.

A few of the passengers expected they would win the battle. Before Lyzbeth Glick turned over the phone to her father because she couldn't bear to listen anymore, her husband told her, "Hang on the line. I'll be back."

At about 10:03 a.m., a black crater bloomed in the soft earth of a field 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh.

The wife in California, the father-in-law in New York, the operator in suburban Chicago still held onto their phones.

They held on, waiting and hoping in the silence.

Tribune reporters Douglas Holt, Naftali Bendavid and Dan Mihalopoulos contributed to this report.

Copyright © 2001, The Chicago TribuneThe Boeing 757 took several sharp turns all within about two or three minutes of each other near Weirton, halfway through the 87-minute flight, according to Flight Explorer.

 

 

Forty-five minutes. That's how long American Airlines Flight 77 meandered through the air headed for the White House, its flight plan abandoned, its radar beacon silent.

 

Published Friday, September 14, 2001

 

Tracking of jet reviewed

 

Who watched as flight plan was aborted?

BY JOSEPH TANFANI AND ALFONSO CHARDY
jtanfani@herald.com

Forty-five minutes. That's how long American Airlines Flight 77 meandered through the air headed for the White House, its flight plan abandoned, its radar beacon silent.

Originally bound for Los Angeles from Washington, it got as far as the Ohio border before terrorists disabled the aircraft's transponder, a piece of equipment that sends a signal back to control centers.

It was about 9 a.m.

At that moment, the north tower of the World Trade Center was already in flames.

Minutes later, a second airliner would crash into the south tower, providing unmistakable evidence that the United States was under terrorist attack.

Meanwhile Flight 77 was turning around, streaking back east over Virginia toward the White House and finally slamming into the Pentagon at 9:45 a.m.

Who was watching in those 45 minutes?

``That's a question that more and more people are going to ask,'' said one controller in Miami. ``What the hell went on here? Was anyone doing anything about it? Just as a national defense thing, how are they able to fly around and no one go after them?''

Even with the transponder silent, the plane should have been visible on radar, both to controllers who handle cross-continent air traffic and to a Federal Aviation Administration command center outside of Washington, according to air traffic controllers.

The FAA, which handles air traffic control, would not discuss the track of Flight 77 or what happened in air-control centers while it was in flight. Neither would American Airlines.

CONTROLLERS' VIEW

On Thursday, FBI agents were trying to answer those questions, interviewing controllers at the regional Air Route Traffic Control Center in Leesburg, Va.

Flight 77 took off at 8:10 a.m. from Dulles International Airport, and proceeded normally until it got to about the Ohio border, according to Flight Explorer, a company that tracks air traffic for private clients. The transponder went off about 9 a.m., the company said.

At that moment, the flight would have been under the control of the Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center, one of 20 regional centers that track flights between airports.

The trouble should have been instantly noticeable, traffic controllers say.

Flight 77, like other planes, at first showed up on radar screens as a short solid line, with a readout that identifies the plane and gives its altitude and speed. When the transponder shuts down, the short line vanishes. The speed number goes away, too.

``It's just something that catches your eye,'' one controller says.

And it's not that unusual. Transponders fail from time to time; commercial aircraft are required to carry a spare. Although it isn't clear what happened in the case of Flight 77, a controller's first move typically would be to contact the pilot, and tell them the transponder wasn't working.

SWITCHING TO RADAR

But even if the plane remained silent, controllers could still find it -- by switching their screen display to the old-fashioned radar that bounces a signal off the plane's metal skin.

Many controllers who track high-flying planes have little experience using that harder-to-read system, one former controller said.

``You'll have controllers with 10 years experience who never track an airplane without a transponder. It just doesn't happen,'' said Ed Freeman, a Maryland consultant who spent 24 years as an air traffic controller.

At about 9:25 a.m., television commentator Barbara Olson called her husband -- Solicitor General Theodore Olson -- and reported that the plane had been hijacked.

Five minutes later, she called back to say the pilot was with the passengers in the back of the plane.

About that time, controllers across the country were frantically trying to get all planes out of the air, ordering all pilots to land at the nearest airport.

Flight 77 was heading directly toward the restricted airspace over the White House when it banked sharply to the right and approached the Pentagon.

Military jets are routinely scrambled in the case of hijackings and ``runners,'' planes that do not answer or do not heed air traffic controllers. But FAA officials would not say when controllers detected the errant Flight 77 or whether any fighter jets were able to get into the air to confront it.

Fighter jets are based nearby, in Virginia, and could have reached the White House within minutes, aviation sources say.

In at least one other case, American Flight 11, controllers knew it was a hijacking while it was in the air.

The pilot, who apparently flew the plane much of the way from Boston to New York, pushed a button on the aircraft yoke that allowed controllers to hear what was going on: the hijacker giving orders in a threatening voice, and the pilot trying to be calm, according to an account in the Christian Science Monitor.

Two F-15 jets were scrambled from Otis Air Force Base in New York, the newspaper reported, but the controllers report the plane vanished from the radar just before or after they got in the air. It was the first plane that hit the World Trade Center tower.

Pilots and controllers have instructions on how to handle a typical hijacking.

If the transponder is still working, pilots punch in a four-digit code that tells controllers the plane is being hijacked. Once that signal is received, a controller is supposed to call the aircraft and ask, subtly, if the pilot meant to send the transmission.

The FAA has a detailed hijacking manual: Supervisors are notified. The FAA command center near Washington and the FBI are put on alert. Military jets are scrambled to follow the plane. Air-traffic controllers try to figure out where the hijacker wants to go and, if necessary, clear an air space of other traffic.

The FBI has well-rehearsed plans to send negotiators and hostage rescue teams to airport.

But there's nothing in the security plan that talks about terrorist-flown planes turned into missiles, say experts and former FAA and FBI officials. The plan assumes hijackers want to use the plane to extort something -- not to use it as a suicide bomb.

``I know we thought and talked about it,'' said Robert M. Blitzer, a consultant and former counterterrorism chief at the FBI.

``I just don't know that anyone imagined in reality that something like this would ever happen.''


Flight 93

 

At some point, before the plane reached Cleveland, the hijackers took over the plane, armed with knives and the threat of a bomb.

Around 9:30 a.m., air-traffic controllers in Cleveland heard someone in the cockpit say, "Hey, get out of here!" according to a source close to the investigation.

Then, in what was described as a thick Arabic accent, a voice was heard that appeared to be addressing passengers, even though it was radioed to air-traffic control.

"This is your captain," the man said. "There is a bomb on board. Remain in your seats. We are returning to the airport."

How the hijackers overpowered the pilots remains unclear. One passenger would report in a telephone call that two people lay on the floor in the first-class cabin, either injured or dead. They appeared to be the pilot and co-pilot, he said, relating information from a flight attendant. Another told a friend that two people had their throats slit but didn't identify them. A third saw only one injured.

At least five passengers and flight attendants described the hijackers in their calls in similar terms: three men, wearing red bandannas, one with some sort of box strapped around his waist that he claimed was a bomb. One passenger reported that two of the hijackers were in the cockpit and a third guarded passengers in first-class from behind a curtain.

4th hijacker not seen

None of the callers mentioned a fourth hijacker, although the FBI has identified four men in connection with the hijacking.

Those men are Saeed Alghamdi, Ahmed Ibrahim A. Al Haznawi, Ahmed Alnami and Ziad Samir Jarrah.

It may be that the people who made calls were unable to see the fourth hijacker. Some news reports have suggested one may have already gained access to the cockpit, as a uniformed guest pilot sitting in the spare jump-seat. Or, some terrorism experts suggest, he may have played a role as a "back-up," perhaps remaining unidentified among the other passengers or hiding in the bathroom until he was needed.

A Justice Department spokeswoman said Friday that their "best information" shows that four were involved.

By 9:36 a.m., United Flight 93 had suddenly changed course, according to flight path information provided by Flight Explorer, a firm that supplies real-time radar tracking data, making a U-turn and heading back toward Washington.

Frantic calls begin

In the cabin, passengers frantically began making calls, 23 of them from the seat-back phones alone from 9:31 to 9:53 a.m. Others passed cell phones to people who had been strangers just minutes before.

Why so many people were able to make calls while apparently under guard by hijackers could be that, as one passenger reported, there was no hijacker among the passengers in coach.

Some of the telephone calls were short--no more than a few rushed words of fear or love.

Lauren Grandcolas, flying home to San Rafael, Calif., from her grandmother's funeral, left a message for her husband saying her flight had been hijacked but she was "comfortable, for now."

Linda Gronlund and Joe Deluca, on their way to San Francisco for a vacation together, took turns. She called her sister to say she would miss her. He called his father.

"The plane's been hijacked," he said. "I love you."

Andrew Garcia, an Air National Guard air traffic controller and plane buff, only managed to get out his wife's name, "Dorothy," before his phone went dead.

Other passengers, though, managed to conduct fairly lengthy, even repeated conversations during the plane's final minutes, constructing a jumbled puzzle of what was happening inside the Boeing 757.

Deena Burnett was feeding her three daughters breakfast and watching the news in horror when the telephone rang in her home in San Ramon, Calif.

"Are you OK?" she asked her husband, Tom, 38.

"No," he said. "I'm on the airplane and it's been hijacked."

He told his wife that the hijackers had already stabbed someone. He told her to call the authorities, and he hung up.

When he called back, she was on the line to the FBI. She told him about the World Trade Center, the first he knew of the attack. He paused. "Were they commercial airplanes?" he asked.

Deena Burnett didn't think so. Cargo or private planes, she said.

"Do you know anything else about the planes?" No, she said.

"Do you know who was involved?" Again, she said no.

He told her that the man who was stabbed had died.

The hijackers are talking about running the plane into the ground, he said. Then he said he had to go.

His third call came about 9:41 a.m., shortly after a plane had hit the Pentagon. "OK," he said. "We're going to do something."

In his fourth and final call, just before 10 a.m., Burnett said he was sure the hijackers didn't have a bomb, that he thought they only had knives.

"There's a group of us who are going to do something," he repeated.

Deena Burnett thought about her years of training as a flight attendant, where she was taught to appease hijackers, to meet their demands, to stay in the background. She told her husband to sit down. "Don't draw attention to yourself," she said.

She told him she loved him. She felt he thought he was coming home that night. This was simply a problem that he was going to solve, as he had solved many others.

Takeover plots hatching

As Burnett talked with his wife, three other men who may have joined him in whatever plans were being hatched made calls of their own.

Across the aisle in Seat 4D, Mark Bingham, 31, called his mother. He was so rattled that when Alice Hoglan got on the line, her son told her, "This is Mark Bingham."

His message was brief: The plane had been hijacked by three men and he loved her.

In the rear of the plane, Jeremy Glick, also 31, a sales manager for a Web site firm and former judo champion, called his wife from a seatback phone. He described three Middle Eastern men brandishing knives and a red box.

His wife told him about the attacks at the World Trade Center. He tried to grasp the hijackers' plans--to blow up the plane or fly it into a target?

The passengers had taken a vote among themselves, he said. They had decided to try to take back the plane.

"I told him to go ahead and do it," Lyzbeth Glick said on "Good Morning America. "I trusted his instincts, and I said, `Do what you have to do.' I knew that I thought he could do it."

Details relayed to operator

Beamer, 32, an account manager for Oracle Corp., called a stranger. He picked up a seat-back phone and hit "0," and at 9:45 a.m., he was connected first to a dispatcher for GTE Airfone, and then to Lisa Jefferson, the operator's supervisor.

For 13 minutes, Beamer told Jefferson everything he could, passing along information he gleaned himself as well as from a flight attendant. The passengers remained in their seats, she said he told her, and the flight attendants were forced to sit in the back of the plane.

He told her how much he loved his pregnant wife and two sons, and he asked her to call them. He asked her to say the Lord's Prayer and 23rd Psalm with him.

Moments later, Beamer told Jefferson about the plan, that the passengers were going to run up the long, narrow aisle to the first-class cabin and attack the hijacker there.

"I'm going to have to go out on faith," Beamer said.

He turned to someone else, and he said, "Are you ready?" Then, in the last words Jefferson would hear from him, "OK. Let's roll."

Sandra Bradshaw, the flight attendant, also identified three hijackers when she called her husband in Greensboro, N.C. She had been moved to the back of the plane, she said, but she and other passengers had a plan. They were going to rush their captors; she was boiling water to throw on them.

Another passenger, Elizabeth Wainio, also apparently talked of a plan to rush the hijackers. In a call she made to her stepmother in Baltimore, using the cell phone lent to her by Lauren Grandcolas, she said, "I've got to go now, Mom, they're breaking into the cockpit," according to the mother of another passenger, who said she spoke with family members about the call. Wainio's parents declined comment.

The accounts of these calls--if accurate--would indicate that at least four people were somehow plotting to attack the hijackers. If Beamer's report is accurate, they were seated in different sections of the plane, with Bingham and Burnett up front, while the others were in the back.

It may be there were separate plans to take the plane or that somehow, amid all the telephone calls, chaos and fear, the passengers were able to communicate with each other.

If they did, they may have known they had another pilot among them, Donald Greene, chief executive officer of Safe Flight Instrument Corp. in New York. Greene, according to his family, knew anything and everything about airplanes.

At about 9:54 a.m., the plane started flying erratically. In Oak Brook, Ill., Jefferson heard screams in the background.

Flight plan changes

Two minutes later, the plane's flight plan changed. The destination airport was changed from San Francisco International to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. Estimated time of arrival: 10:28 a.m.

At nearly the same moment, from the plane's bathroom, someone called 911, repeating that Flight 93 had been hijacked, that this was not a hoax.

Then, Marion Britton called a longtime friend, Fred Fiumano, at his New York City auto shop.

Britton, crying, told him the plane was turning around. It was going to go down.

"Don't worry about it," Fiumano said, trying desperately to reassure her. "They're only taking you for a ride."

He heard yelling and screaming in the background, and then the phone went dead. He tried to call the cellular phone number back, but no one answered.

A few of the passengers expected they would win the battle. Before Lyzbeth Glick turned over the phone to her father because she couldn't bear to listen anymore, her husband told her, "Hang on the line. I'll be back."

At about 10:03 a.m., a black crater bloomed in the soft earth of a field 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh.

The wife in California, the father-in-law in New York, the operator in suburban Chicago still held onto their phones.

They held on, waiting and hoping in the silence.

Tribune reporters Douglas Holt, Naftali Bendavid and Dan Mihalopoulos contributed to this report.

Copyright © 2001, The Chicago TribuneThe Boeing 757 took several sharp turns all within about two or three minutes of each other near Weirton, halfway through the 87-minute flight, according to Flight Explorer.

Unanswered Questions About US Attacks 

09/26/2001



Consultations with numerous professional pilots and security experts, regarding the attacks of Sept. 11, have raised the following questions: 

1) How could an operation of this size and sophistication, involving up to 100 individuals, possibly go undetected? Was this a colossal 'intelligence failure,' or was the failure itself organized? 

2) How were the hijackers able to overcome the entire flight crews, without one of the pilots being able to punch a 4-digit code into the aircraft's transponder or say something on radio, to inform the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) of the hijacking? If the hijackers might succeed in one case or two, it is amazing, if not unbelievable, that they could do so in four cases. Were the pilots who took command of the planes from the beginning, the hijackers? If so, the hijacker pilots must know the procedures used by flight crew members, which are precise and complicated, and differ from airline to airline. 

Many pilots say that a terrorist with minimal training could have conducted these maneuvers. But, what are the chances of such success by four amateurs? The former commander of the Israeli Air Force, Major General Eiten Ben Eliahu said, in an Israeli radio interview, that he believed that the pilots must have been Americans, not foreigners. The fact that the attacks had to occur during clear skies, means the operation must have had several target dates. This adds another level of complexity. 

3) Why did all emergency procedures fail? Several professional pilots have made this point, including a recent article in the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, by its military commentator. All four planes grossly deviated from their flight paths. Under FAA procedures, the moment it is detected that an aircraft has deviated from its assigned flight path, the FAA immediately tries to contact pilots. If it fails, an emergency is declared and all air space in the area is secured. In the course of such an emergency, procedures are followed to determine whether the airplane was hijacked or out of control. Because the time factor is so crucial, these emergency procedures are well defined and exercised, to be implemented as rapidly as possible. In certain emergencies, especially hijacking, US military resources are drawn on as a matter of routine. 

It has been reported that the transponders of the aircraft were turned off. This alone would trigger emergency procedures. Even if turned off, they would not disappear from the radars which would continue to track the flight path. 

American Airlines flight 11 and United Airlines flight 175, the two aircraft that hit the World Trade Center, took off from Boston's Logan Airport at 7:59 and 7:58 respectively. The former hit the World Trade Center 46 minutes later. The latter, 66 minutes later. They both grossly deviated from their assigned flight paths, especially UA 175. Under emergency conditions, this is a tremendous length of time. 

In the case of the Pentagon attack, the facts appear even more extraordinary. American Airlines flight 77 departed from Washington's Dulles airport for Los Angeles. It flew west for 40 minutes, made a U-turn and started to return to Washington, and hit the Pentagon 40 minutes later, at 9:40. 

United Airlines flight 93 took off from Newark Airport in New Jersey heading for San Francisco, made a U-turn over Cleveland, Ohio and crashed in Pennsylvania. 

The exact sequence of events over this almost 2-hour time-frame has not been made public, despite press leaks. 

Security sources have asked the question regarding the role of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which is responsible for defending US and Canadian airspace from attack by missiles, aircraft or space vehicles. This US-Canadian command has its own military radars, SAM systems, US F-15 and F-16 jet intercepters and Canadian CF-18 intercepters. 

Although NORAD says they did not have time to react, this cannot be. Within the areas where these aircraft were operating, there are numerous air bases which can deploy fighters, and reach the targeted airplane within three minutes. This is especially the case around Washington, where Langley Air Base, next to the CIA headquarters, is the most famous. F-15s, the most capable intercepters in the world, are based there. 

In the air emergency that would have been declared in all four cases, a decision would have been made on whether to deploy US military aircraft. Military aircraft are routinely deployed in such situations if only to maintain air safety. 

In the case of flight AA 77, which was in its wildcat flight for no less then 40 minutes, headed for the US capital, after the successful attack on the World Trade Center, there was plenty of time to not only deploy military aircraft but to implement national security emergency plans to secure the safety of the President and the nation's capital. There would have been plenty of time to decide whether or not to shoot it down. The matter of the delayed response is so serious, it was raised to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard Myers, in a Senate hearing Sept. 13, who answered evcasively. 

There was an apparent collapse of emergency procedures, of the FAA, NORAD and special national security emergency procedures to secure the President. Security experts point to the impossibility of such a collapse caused by the fog generated by an unexpected attack. This collapse could only point to sabotage within the system as part of a coordinated attack on the US.

Indianapolis High Altitude Air Traffic Control Center coverage area

3) Last tracked location of Flight 77

(flight heads back to D.C. and crashes into Pentagon)

Timeline of Events

7:45 a.m. American Airlines Flight 11 leaves Boston for Los Angeles.

7:58 United Airlines Flight 175 leaves Boston for Los Angeles.

8:01 United Airlines Flight 93 leaves Newark for San Francisco.

8:10 American Airlines Flight 77 leaves Washington for Los Angeles.

8:20 Air trafÞc controllers in New England suspect Flight 11 has been hijacked.

8:40 FAA notifies NEADS (Northeast Air Defense Sector) of NORAD, the military's civil defense system, about Flight 11.

8:43 FAA notifies NEADS about Flight 175.

8:46 American Airlines Flight 11 hits the World Trade Center's north tower.

Two F-15 fighter jets from Otis Air National

Guard Base on Cape Cod, 153 miles from New

York City, are ordered to go to New York.

8:52 F-15s become airborne.

8:55 Flight 77 stops flying west and turns east.

8:56 Air traffic controllers in Indianapolis lose radar contact with Flight 77.

9:02 United Flight 175 hits the World Trade Center's south tower.

9:03 Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center halts traffic from its airports to all New York area airspace.

9:05 Flight 77 appears as an unidentified blip

on radar over West Virginia.

9:06 Order is expanded to include the entire Northeast from Washington to Cleveland. FAA's air traffic control center outside

Washington notifies all air traffic facilities nationwide of the suspected hijacking of Flight 11.

9:08 FAA orders all aircraft to leave New York area airspace and orders all New York-bound planes nationwide to stay on the ground.

9:17 New York City airports shut down.

9:24 FAA notifies NEADS about Flight 77.

9:24 Two F-16 fighter jets from Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Va., ordered to take off for Washington.

9:26 FAA halts takeoffs nationwide. Airborne international flights told to land in Canada.

9:30 Two F-16s take off from Langley AFB.

9:37 Flight 77 hits the Pentagon.

9:45 FAA orders all planes in the air to land at the nearest airport.

9:48 Capitol and West Wing of White House evacuated.

10:03 United Flight 93 crashes 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh.

10:15 2,000 planes have landed in the U.S. since 9:45 order was issued.

12:16 All aircraft ordered to land at 9:45 have landed.

SOURCE: Compiled from wire sources, press reports and government records

Copyright http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/nation/ny-uspent232380681sep23.story?coll=ny-nationalnews-print

1